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The Persepolis Tablets have withstood two battles in their lifetime. 
In 329/330 B.C., Alexander the Great stormed the Persian Gates and 
captured the Persian city of Persepolis before burning it to the ground. 
The tablets survived Alexander’s sack of Persepolis, but they faced a 
second battle this past year. This time it was a legal battle, fought by 
the victims of a terrorist attack on the one hand, and the tablet’s 
stewards on the other. The battle threatened to dismember this unique 
collection of antiquities by auctioning off each tablet piece by piece. 
Had the victims won, the single most important surviving insight1 into 
the organization of the 2,500-year-old Persian Empire would be sold 
into the living rooms of private collectors around the world.  
The Persepolis Tablets have been likened to the “crown jewels of 
England, or the original document of the Magna Carta, or the Western 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, December 2016, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois 
Institute of Technology; B.A., New York University, 2013.  
1 Amy Braverman Puma, Worth Millions . . . or Priceless?, U. CHI. MAG., Oct. 
2006, at 16, 18.  
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Wall in Jerusalem, or the Parthenon in Athens.”2  Why would such an 
important piece of history be put up for auction? Perhaps only the 
harrowing tale of the plaintiffs in Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran 
could justify such a sorrow.  
On the afternoon of September 4, 1997, hundreds of people 
gathered at the Ben-Yehuda Street mall on one of Jerusalem’s main 
streets to shop, dine, and enjoy the nice weather.3 Three Hamas suicide 
bombers entered the crowded mall and detonated five pounds of 
explosives packed with nails, screws, glass, and chemical poisons.4 
The blast shattered windows, collapsed buildings, and propelled 
bodies through the air.5 Five people were killed, and nearly two 
hundred were injured.6 Among the injured were eight Americans: 
Diana Campuzano, Avi Elishis, Gregg Salzman, Jenny Rubin, Daniel 
Miller, Abraham Mendelson, Stuart Hersh, and Noam Rozenman.7 
The victims suffered life-threatening injuries and to this day continue 
to suffer physical and psychological effects of the blast.8  
In addition to the eight American victims, four of the victim’s 
family members not present that day—Deborah Rubin, Renay Frym, 
Elena Rozenman, and Tzvi Rozenman—sought recovery for the 
emotional injuries caused by watching their loved ones suffer, and for 
the time and effort required to provide full-time care to them in the 
attack’s immediate aftermath.9 Together, these thirteen victims 
                                                 
2 Gil J. Stein, A Heritage Threatened: The Persepolis Tablets Lawsuit and the 
Oriental Institute, ORIENTAL INST. NEWS & NOTES, Jan. 2007, at 3–4.  







9 Id. at 267–68.   
2
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 7
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol12/iss1/7




brought suit against the Islamic Republic of Iran in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia.10  
In September 2003, the plaintiffs were awarded a default judgment 
against Iran for providing Hamas with training, money, and 
operational support that aided in the 1997 attack.11 This award—
comprised of $71.5 million in compensatory damages and $300 
million in punitive damages12—was far from the end of the road for 
the victims. Thirteen years later, they are still unable to collect on the 
judgment, but they continue to seek justice by bringing suit in 
jurisdictions throughout the United States. Rubin v. Islamic Republic 
of Iran is one such suit.13  
In order to satisfy their judgment, the Rubin plaintiffs sought to 
obtain possession of Iranian cultural artifacts, including the Persepolis 
Tablets, located in various Chicago museums and institutions.14 The 
plaintiffs set forth three bases for obtaining execution jurisdiction over 
these cultural artifacts: §1610(a) and § 1610(g) of the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), and § 201(a) of the Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act (“TRIA”).15  
The Seventh Circuit in Rubin held that the Persepolis Tablets may 
not be used to execute the Rubin plaintiff’s judgment against Iran.16 
Pursuant to the FSIA, the court restricted execution to foreign 
sovereign assets that are used by the foreign sovereign itself for 
commercial activity in the United States, ultimately preventing such 
execution.17  
The Seventh Circuit created a circuit split by expressly declining to 
follow the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bennett v. Islamic Republic of 
                                                 
10
 Id. The Rubin plaintiffs also sued and obtained a default judgment against 
Hamas. Rubin v. Hamas-Islamic Resistance Movement, No. CIV.A. 02-0975 
(RMU), 2004 WL 2216489, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2004). 
11 Id. at 265.  
12 Id. 
13 Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2016).  
14 Id. at 473. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 489. 
17 Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a). 
3
Stephens: Storming the Persian Gates: The Seventh Circuit Denies Attachment
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017




Iran.18 Bennett held that § 1610(g) provides a freestanding basis for 
executing judgments for state sponsored terrorism, which enabled the 
Bennett plaintiffs to execute on assets that were not used commercially 
in the United States.19 If followed by the Seventh Circuit, this would 
have allowed the Rubin plaintiffs to execute their judgment on the 
museum collection at issue in this case. Additionally, the court 
partially overruled two previous Seventh Circuit decisions to the 
extent that they can be read as holding that § 1610(g) is a freestanding 
exception to execution immunity for terrorism-related judgments.20 
This further narrowed the ability for terrorism victims to execute their 
judgments.  
This Note first sets forth the historical development of foreign 
sovereign immunity in the United States, and how the law has 
developed into what it is today. Next, it examines the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Rubin, focusing on the court’s decision to 
partially overrule Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic and Gates v. Syrian 
Arab Republic and the court’s rejection of the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
in Bennett. The analysis of this decision relates to the issue of whether 
the FSIA § 1610(g) offers a freestanding basis for executing 
judgments against state sponsors of terrorism, independent of 
§ 1610(a) and (b). Finally, this Note concludes that, from a statutory 
interpretation perspective, the Seventh Circuit reached the correct 
result in denying the plaintiffs execution on the Persepolis Tablets. 
Additionally, auctioning cultural property raises policy concerns that 
further buttress the Seventh Circuit’s outcome. However, the Rubin 
plaintiffs are deserving victims who have been denied execution of 
their judgment despite repeated attempts to do so. The Rubin victims 
are not alone; many other victims of state-sponsored terrorism have 
been unsuccessful at receiving compensation for their grievous 
injuries. This Note argues that, in lieu of a judicial remedy of the kind 
                                                 
18 Id.at 487. 
 19 Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 825 F.3d 949, 960 (9th Cir. 2016). 
20 Rubin, 830 F.3d at 487. See Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 800 F.3d 331, 
342–43 (7th Cir. 2015); Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 755 F.3d 568, 575–77 (7th 
Cir. 2014). 
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the plaintiffs sought, the executive branch should establish a 
comprehensive victim’s compensation fund, paid for by the United 
States government, to compensate the victims of state-sponsored 
terrorism.  
 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The Foreign Sovern Immunities Act provides the sole basis for 
obtaining jurisdiction over foreign states in both state and federal 
courts.21 The foreign sovereign immunity doctrine developed at 
common law in United States’ historical nascence.22 At that time, the 
United States accorded foreign states and governments “absolute” 
immunity from suit in domestic court based on principles of customary 
international law.23 The doctrine “is premised upon the ‘perfect 
equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and th[e] common 
interest in impelling them to’” mutual association.24 Due to its control 
of foreign relations, the executive branch traditionally made 
determinations of immunity, and was accorded deference to determine 
when the judiciary was permitted to override the presumption of 
immunity and subject a foreign sovereign to suit. 
In 1952, the United States abandoned “absolute” sovereign 
immunity when the Department of State adopted the “restrictive” 
                                                 
21 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 
(1989). 
22 See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 311 (2010); Republic of the 
Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 865 (2008); Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 
541 U.S. 677, 688–89 (2004). 
23 The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812) articulated the 
general principle that the United States generally granted foreign sovereigns 
complete immunity from suit. That opinion “came to be regarded as extending 
virtual absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns.” Verlinden v. Central Bank of 
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).   
24 Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 137. See also Nat’l City Bank of N.Y. v. 
Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 362 (1955) (foreign sovereign immunity is based 
on “reciprocal self-interest . . . and respect for the ‘power and dignity’ of the foreign 
sovereign.”). 
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theory of sovereign immunity.25 The restrictive theory reflects the 
view that foreign sovereign immunity is preserved for sovereign or 
“public” acts, but disputes that arise from a state’s commercial 
activities may be adjudicated in United States court.26  
This “restrictive” approach toward immunity advocated by the 
Department of State was later codified when Congress enacted the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).27 In addition to 
shifting foreign sovereign immunity decision-making from the 
executive branch to the courts, the FSIA set forth “a comprehensive set 
of legal standards governing claims of immunity in every civil action 
against a foreign state or its political subdivisions, agencies, or 
instrumentalities.”28 Accordingly, the FSIA provides the sole basis for 
obtaining jurisdiction over foreign states in both state and federal 
court.29  
The FSIA codifies the rules for obtaining jurisdiction over 
foreign states in state and federal United States courts. Foreign states 
and governments are immune from suit in the United States unless one 
of the FSIA’s specific exceptions applies.30 One such exception is 
“Acts of State-Sponsored Terrorism”, which permits a foreign state to 
be sued in the United States.31 The FSIA also provides that foreign 
state and government property is immune from attachment and 
execution in the United States unless any one of the FSIA’s specific 
                                                 
25 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to 
Philip B. Perlman, Acting U.S. Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 
Dep’t St. Bull. 984–85 (1952) and Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of 
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711–15 (1976). 
26 DAVID P. STEWART, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITIES ACT: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES 5 (2013). 
27 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11. 
28 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488.  
29 Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2255 (2014) 
(quoting Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488); Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 755 F.3d 568, 
571 (7th Cir. 2014). 
30 28 U.S.C. § 1604.  
31 Id. §§ 1605–07. 
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exceptions applies.32 Pertinent to the Rubin case, property belonging to 
a foreign state that is located in the United States and used for 
commercial activity in the United States may be attached and executed 
if one of seven enumerated conditions is satisfied.33 Additionally, a 
terrorism victim who wins a § 1605A judgment may execute on the 
property of the foreign state.34  
 
A.  Jurisdictional Immunity  
 
Under the FSIA, foreign states and governments are immune from 
suit in the United States unless one of the FSIA’s specific exceptions 
applies.35 The basic rule, stated in 28 U.S.C. § 1604, provides that:  
 
Subject to existing international agreements to 
which the United States is a party at the time of 
enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be 
immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
United States and of the States except as provided 
in section 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.36 
 
The FSIA lists nine exceptions to sovereign immunity, in which 
foreign states are subject to the jurisdiction of United States courts: 
waiver, commercial acts, expropriations, rights in certain kinds of 
property in the United States, non-commercial torts, enforcement of 
arbitral agreements and awards,37 cases arising from certain acts of 
state-sponsored terrorism,38 maritime liens, preferred mortgages,39 and 
counterclaims.40 
                                                 
32 Id. § 1609. 
33 Id. § 1610(a).  
34 Id. § 1610(g). 
35 Id. § 1604. 
36 Id. § 1604. See also Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993).  
37 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a). 
38 Id. § 1605A. 
39 Id. § 1605 (b)–(d). 
40 Id. § 1607. 
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Acts of state-sponsored terrorism first became an exception to 
foreign sovereign immunity in 1996 after a series of significant 
terrorist incidents in the 1980’s and 1990’s.41 This exception was 
codified under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).42 Section 1605(a)(7) stripped 
foreign states of their immunity with respect to cases seeking money 
damages for personal injury or death caused by torture, extrajudicial 
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material 
support or resources engaged in by specifically designated states or 
their officials.43  
In response to difficulties that plaintiffs faced in asserting 
jurisdiction under this exception,44 Congress passed the Flatow 
Amendment to clarify the provision.45 The Flatow Amendment sought 
to enable terror victims to recover in private causes of action, and 
provided that money damages in FSIA suits could include economic 
damages, solatium,46 pain and suffering, and punitive damages.47 
However, the Flatow Amendment failed to resolve the most significant 
obstacles facing plaintiffs under the statute: in spite of the amendment, 
courts issued contradictory opinions on whether the exception 
provided a cause of action against a foreign state itself,48 or only a 
                                                 
41 STEWART, supra note 26, at 83. 
42 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 221, Stat. 12241 
(1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)) (amended 1996).  
43 Id. 
44 See id.; Flatow v. Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 15 (D.D.C. 1998) (ruling that § 
1605(a)(7) did not itself create a federal cause of action, but merely allowed 
plaintiffs to bring suit in federal court for claims based on state law).  
45 Flatow Ammendment, Pub. L. No. 104–208, Div. A, § 589, 110 Stat. 3009-
172 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (Supp. 2002)) (repealed 2008). 
46 Solatium damages are available to FSIA plaintiffs when extreme and 
outrageous conduct has caused grief and anguish to plaintiffs closely related to a 
victim of terrorism. Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 
265, 73 (D.D.C. 2003). E.g., Flatow, 999 F.Supp. at 29; Surette v. Islamic Republic 
of Iran, 231 F.Supp.2d 260, 269–70 (D.D.C. 2002).  
 47 Flatow Amendment § 589. 
48 See, e.g., Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 271 F. Supp. 2d 179, 214 (D.D.C. 2003); 
Kilburn v. Republic of Iran, 277 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003); Pugh v. Socialist 
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 290 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D.D.C. 2003). 
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cause of action against the individual officials, employees, or agents of 
a foreign state.49 
 As a result, § 1605(a)(7) was repealed in 2008 and replaced with 
28 U.S.C. § 1605A.50 The new provision clearly established a private 
right of action, re-codified the provisions for the award of punitive 
damages, authorized compensation for special masters to assist the 
courts in resolving cases, and incorporated new mechanisms for the 
enforcement of judgments.51 
 The terrorism exception provides that a foreign state shall not be 
immune from jurisdiction: 
 
[I]n any case . . . in which money damages are 
sought against a foreign state for personal injury or 
death that was caused by an act of torture, 
extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage 
taking, or the provision of material support or 
resources for such an act if such act or provision of 
material support or resources is engaged in by an 
official, employee, or agent of such foreign state 
while acting within the scope of his or her office, 
employment, or agency.52 
 
                                                 
49 Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(holding that neither § 1605(a)(7) nor the Flatow Amendment created a private right 
of action against foreign state sponsors of terrorism, removing the basis for punitive 
damage awards); Acree, 370 F.3d at 59–60 (holding that plaintiffs must identify a 
“particular cause of action raising out of a specific source of law”). 
50 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
181, Div. A, § 1083 (2008), 122 Stat. 338, 338–44 (NDAA) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 
1605A). 
51 In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 39 
(D.D.C. 2009). 28 U.S.C. § 1605A is “more comprehensive and more favorable to 
plaintiffs because it adds a broad array of substantive rights and remedies that simply 
were not available in actions under” previous law. Id. at 58.  
52 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1) (2010). 
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 In the majority of state-sponsored terrorism cases brought under 
the terrorism exception, neither the foreign state nor the individuals 
named as defendants appear or answer.53 In those cases, § 1608(e) 
provides that a default judgment can be entered against a foreign state 
after the plaintiff “establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence 
that is satisfactory to the court.”54  
 Although the FSIA generally prohibits the award or recovery of 
punitive damages against foreign states,55 the terrorism exception 
explicitly provides the ability to collect economic, solatium, pain and 
suffering, and punitive damages.56 Such judgments are awarded both 
to punish defendants and to deter future terrorist acts.  
 
B.  Execution Immunity  
 
In addition to jurisdictional immunity, the FSIA provides 
foreign states with presumptive immunity from pre-judgment 
attachment and post-judgment execution of judgments on foreign 
states’ property. Defeating foreign states’ jurisdictional immunity does 
not automatically entitle a plaintiff to collect on a favorable judgment, 
however. Plaintiffs must separately obtain execution immunity, the 
rules governing which are in some respects more restrictive than 
jurisdictional rules.57 Thus, a foreign state may validly be subject to a 
court’s jurisdiction but be insulated from the execution of a resulting 
judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1609 lays out the basic rule on execution 
immunity:  
 
Subject to existing international agreements to 
which the United States is a party at the time of 
enactment of this Act the property in the United 
States of a foreign state shall be immune from 
                                                 
53 STEWART, supra note 26, at 89. 
54 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). 
55 Id. § 1606. 
56 Id. § 1605A(c)(4). 
57 STEWART, supra note 26, at 3. 
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attachment arrest and execution except as provided 
in sections 1610 and 1611 of this chapter.58 
 
 Many of the judgments rendered under the terrorism exception 
have been substantial, sometimes exceeding $100 million.59 Most of 
the judgments have been default judgments, and most claimants 
remain unsatisfied.60 Despite § 1610 and § 1611’s exceptions to 
execution immunity, plaintiffs have had great difficulty executing their 
judgments.61 In part, this is a result of the restrictive provisions of the 
law itself, but more generally, this is a result of the fact that designated 
state sponsors of terrorism have taken steps to minimize or eliminate 
any property or assets in the United States that might be subject to 
execution.  
 In response, FSIA provisions governing judgments against state-
sponsors of terrorism have been amended several times, and several 
separate but related statutes, discussed below, have been enacted. This 
changing legislative framework has stimulated various judicial 
interpretations, resulting in a complicated, ever-evolving area of law. 
   
                                                 
58 28 U.S.C. § 1609. 
59 E.g., Acosta v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 574 F. Supp. 2d 15, 31–32 (D.D.C. 
2008) ($300 million in punitive damages); Beer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 789 F. 
Supp. 2d 14, 26 (D.D.C. 2011) ($300 million in punitive damages); Wultz v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 864 F. Supp. 2d 24, 42 ($300 million in punitive damages); Wyatt 
v. Syrian Arab Republic, 908 F. Supp. 2d 216, 233 (D.D.C. 2012) ($300 million in 
punitive damages). 
60 STEWART, supra note 26, at 110. 
61 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1610–11; In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 
659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 37 (D.D.C. 2009) (concluding that “civil litigation against Iran 
under the FSIA state sponsor of terrorism exception represents a failed policy” 
because “[t]he cases do not achieve justice for victims, are not sustainable, and 
threaten to undermine the President’s foreign policy initiatives.” In defense of this 
argument, the court noted there were over ten billion dollars in outstanding court 
judgments but only forty-five million dollars of Iranian assets in the United States). 
11
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1.  Section 1610(a): Limited Exceptions to Execution Immunity 
 
 Section 1610 sets forth limited exceptions to immunity for 
attachment in aid of execution and for execution of judgments 
obtained under the statute against foreign states.62 Under § 1610(a), a 
plaintiff who holds a judgment against a foreign state may execute it 
on the foreign state’s property if the property is located in the United 
States,63 is “used for commercial activity in the United States,”64 and if 
one of seven enumerated conditions is satisfied.65  
 The Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have examined the 
definition of “commercial use” to determine who must use the 
commercial property in the United States for § 1610(a) to be 
triggered.66 The circuits agree that the foreign state must use the 
property for a commercial purpose in order to trigger § 1610(a).67  
 Pertinent to the Rubin case, the seventh enumerated condition, 
§ 1610(a)(7), permits attachment and execution if a judgment is 
                                                 
62 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a). 
63 The FSIA does not apply to the property and assets of a sovereign defendant 
located outside of the United States. Walters v. People’s Republic of China, 672 F. 
Supp. 2d 573, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
64 The property must be “used for the commercial activity upon which the 
claim is based;” thus, “commercial activity” is defined pursuant to § 1603(d). See 
also Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992). However, the 
definition poses difficult factual determinations. See, e.g., EM Ltd. v. Republic of 
Argentina, 473 F.3d 463, 482–83 (2d Cir. 2007) (government repayment of debt to 
IMF is not a “commercial activity”); Af-Cap, Inc. v. Chevron Overseas Ltd., 475 
F.3d 1080, 1091 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[P]roperty is ‘used for a commercial activity in the 
United States’ when the property in question is put into action, put into service, 
availed or employed for a commercial activity, not in connection with a commercial 
activity or in relation to a commercial activity.”). 
65 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1)–(7). 
66 Id. § 1610(a). See Aurelius Capital Partners v. Republic of Argentina, 584 
F.3d 120, 131 (2d Cir. 2009); Conn. Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo, 30 
F.3d 240, 256 n.5 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hat matters under the statute is how the 
foreign state uses the property, not how private parties may have used the 
property.”); Af-Cap. Inc., 475 F.3d at 1090-91 (same). 
67 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a). 
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obtained for a claim of state-sponsored terrorism.68 When the state-
sponsored terrorism exception to jurisdiction was added to the FSIA in 
1996,69 a parallel provision was added at § 1610(a)(7) to permit the 
execution of judgments rendered under the terrorism exception.70 As it 
stands today, § 1610(a)(7) provides that a foreign state’s property in 
the United States, used for commercial activity in the United States, 
shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution:  
 
[I]f the judgment relates to a claim for which the 
foreign state is not immune under section 1605A or 
section 1605(a)(7) . . . regardless of whether the 
property is or was involved with the act upon which 
the claim is based.71    
 
Accordingly, pursuant to § 1610(a)(7), a § 1605A claim that results in 
a judgment against a foreign state extinguishes the state’s execution 
immunity and allows the plaintiff to attach the judgment to the foreign 
state’s property that is used for a commercial purpose.72  
 
2.  Section 1610(g): Easing the Burden on Executing Judgments 
  
 Section 1610(g) of the FSIA is another provision that was 
implemented to ease the collection process for victims of state-
sponsored terrorism.73 Congress enacted § 1610(g) as part of the 
National Defense Authorization Act of 2008,74 which ushered in 
several changes to the FSIA as applied in cases of state-sponsored 
terrorism.75 Section 1610(g) further expanded the category of property 
                                                 
68 Id. § 1610(a)(7). 
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
72 Id.  
73 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g). 
74 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
181, Div. A, § 1083 (2008), 122 Stat. 338 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A). 
75 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g). 
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subject to attachment for cases involving state sponsors. Section 
1610(g) provides that 
  
the property of a foreign state against which a 
judgment is entered under section 1605A . . . is 
subject to attachment in aid of execution, and 
execution, upon that judgment as provided in this 
section, regardless of—(A) the level of economic 
control over the property by the government of the 
foreign state; (B) whether the profits of the property 
go to that government; (C) the degree to which 
officials of that government manage the property or 
otherwise control its daily affairs; (D) whether that 
government is the sole beneficiary in interest of the 
property; or (E) whether establishing the property as 
a separate entity would entitle the foreign state to 
benefits in United States courts while avoiding its 
obligations.76 
 
 Prior to § 1610(g)’s enactment, there was a general presumption 
that a judgment against a foreign state may not be executed on 
property owned by a juridically separate agency or instrumentality.77 
This presumption was established by the Supreme Court in First Nat. 
City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec). The 
Court recognized two exceptions: the holder of a judgment against a 
foreign state may execute on the property of its instrumentality (1) if 
the sovereign and its instrumentalities are alter-egos, or (2) if adhering 
to the rule of separateness would create a fraud or injustice.78 The 
                                                 
76 Id. § 1610(g)(1)(A)–(E).  
77 First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba 
(“Bancec”), 462 U.S. 611, 626–27 (“Due respect for the actions taken by foreign 
sovereigns and for principles of comity between nations leads us to conclude . . . that 
government instrumentalities established as judicial entitles distinct and independent 
from their sovereign should normally be treated as such.”). 
78 Id. at 628–33. 
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court expressly declined to elaborate on these exceptions, leaving 
lower courts to fill in the gaps.79 Soon after Bancec was decided, the 
federal courts coalesced around a set of five factors to determine when 
the exceptions applied.80  
 However, § 1610(g) eliminated the Bancec doctrine by permitting 
a terrorism victim who wins a § 1605A judgment to execute on the 
property of the foreign state and the property of its agency or 
instrumentality “as provided in this section” but “regardless of” the 
five factors listed in subsections (A)–(E).81 The five factors set forth in 
subsections (A)–(E) mirror almost exactly the five factors developed 
by the lower courts under the Bancec doctrine, thereby eliminating the 
Bancec doctrine irrelevant for terrorism-related judgments.82 
Accordingly, § 1610(g) eases the collection process for victims of 
state-sponsored terrorism by eliminating the Bancec rule.  
 
3.  Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
 
 Despite the 1996 amendments to the FSIA, most plaintiffs have 
been unsuccessful at executing judgments against state sponsors of 
terrorism. This is due in part to the fact that the states in question 
typically do not engage in commercial activity in the United States, 
and because many assets that these foreign states possess are typically 
seized or frozen as a result of government sanctions. To help plaintiffs 
                                                 
79 Id. at 633. 
80 See, e.g., Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 308 F.3d 1065, 1071 n.9 (9th 
Cir. 2002); Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of Philippines, 965 F.2d 
1375, 1380–82, 1380–81 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992) (these factors are: (1) the level of 
economic control by the government; (2) whether the entity’s profits go to the 
government; (3) the degree to which the government officials manage the entity or 
otherwise have a hand in its daily affairs; (4) whether the government is the real 
beneficiary of the entity’s conduct; and (5) whether adherence to separate identities 
would entitle the foreign state to benefit in United States courts while avoiding its 
obligations).  
81 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1)(A)–(E). 
82 Id. See also Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 755 F.3d 568, 576 (7th Cir. 
2014). 
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overcome this obstacle, Congress enacted the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act of 2002 (“TRIA”).83 TRIA provides an additional 
exception to the FSIA rule that property of a foreign state is immune 
from attachment and execution in the United States.84 Section 201(a) 
of the TRIA provides that: 
 
in every case in which a person has obtained a 
judgment against a terrorist party on a claim based 
upon an act of terrorism, . . . the blocked assets of 
the terrorist party . . . shall be subject to execution 
or attachment in aid of execution in order to satisfy 
such judgment to the extent of any compensatory 
damages for which such terrorist party has been 
adjudged liable.85 
 
An asset is considered “blocked” when it has been “seized or frozen” 
by the United States pursuant to § 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy 
Act (“TEA”), or under §§ 202 or 203 of the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”).86  
 In response to the 1979 Iran hostage crisis, President Carter issued 
Executive Order 12170, which froze all Iranian assets in the United 
States pursuant to the IEEPA.87 Executive Order 12281 subsequently 
unblocked all uncontested property interests of the Iranian government 
when the Algiers Accords resolved the hostage crisis in 1981.88 The 
order gave implementing authority to the Treasury Department.89 The 
Treasury Department’s office of foreign assets control issued 
                                                 
83 Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 201(a), 116 Stat. 2322, 2337 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 
1610 note (2012)) [hereinafter TRIA].  
84 Id. § 101(b). See 28 U.S.C. § 1609.  
85 Id. § 201(a). See Jerez v. Republic of Cuba, 777 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 
2011).  
86 Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C.A. § 5(b); International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 17011702.  
87 Exec. Order No. 12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (Nov. 14, 1979). 
88 Exec. Order No. 12281, 46 Fed. Reg. 7923 (Jan. 19, 1981). 
89 Id. 
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regulations broadly defining unblocked property as “all uncontested 
and non-contingent liabilities and property interests of the Government 
of Iran, its agencies, instrumentalities, or controlled entities.”90 A 
property interest is considered “contested only if the holder thereof 
reasonably believes that Iran does not have title or has only partial title 
to the asset,” and a belief is considered reasonable “only if it is based 
on a bona fide opinion, in writing, of an attorney licensed to practice 
within the United States stating that Iran does not have title or has only 
partial title to the asset.”91 
 Despite Congress’s intentions, these TRIA provisions have been 
ineffective for several reasons. Generally, determining whether 
particular assets are blocked requires reference to Office of Foreign 
Assets Control (“OFAC”) regulations.92 When they are blocked, 
transactions in those assets are prohibited, and thus the assets may not 
be available to judgment creditors regardless of any sovereign 
immunity shield. When transactions have been licensed, the assets are 
“unblocked” to the extent of the license, and are definitionally outside 
of TRIA § 201.93 Furthermore, one purpose of the TRIA was to 
override OFAC’s regulations and permit attachment and execution 
even when no OFAC license had been issued.94 Yet, the TRIA has been 
ineffective to this end, as few states that sponsor terrorism have assets 
in the United States that may be blocked. TRIA excluded property 
used exclusively for diplomatic or consular purposes and thus such 
property is entitled to immunity and inviolability under the Vienna 
                                                 
90 31 C.F.R. § 535.333(a).  
91 Id. § 535.333(c). 
92 Sanctions under TWEA and IEEPA are administered by the Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) in the U.S. Department of the Treasury. About, 
Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (last updated 
10/14/2016), https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-
structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Foreign-Assets-Control.aspx. 
93 Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 807 F. Supp. 2d 9, 18 n.6 
(D.D.C. 2011). 
94 STEWART, supra note 26, at 117. 
17
Stephens: Storming the Persian Gates: The Seventh Circuit Denies Attachment
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017




Conventions.95 As a result, the practical impact of TRIA has been 
limited.96  
 
II.  RUBIN V. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 
 
A.  The Facts 
 
On September 4, 1997, three members of the Hamas terrorist 
group carried out a suicide bombing in a crowded pedestrian mall in 
Jerusalem.97  Eight U.S. citizens were grievously injured in the 
attack.98 While all eight survived, each victim suffered severe injuries 
including burns covering more than forty percent of the body, over one 
hundred shrapnel entry wounds, permanent nerve damage, perforated 
eardrums, chronic infections, scarring, post-traumatic stress disorder, 
and depression.99   
In 2003, those individuals, along with their close family 
members, filed a civil suit against the Islamic Republic of Iran for its 
role in financing and training the Hamas suicide bombers.100 The 
plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia.101 Iran was subject to the suit as a state-sponsor 
of terrorism under the terrorism exception to the FSIA.102 The 
plaintiffs won a default judgment against Iran, comprised of $71.5 
million in compensatory damages and $300 million in punitive 
damages.103  
                                                 
95 TRIA § 201(d)(2(B)(ii); Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 618 F.3d 19 
(D.C. Cir. 2010). 
96 STEWART, supra note 26, at 110. 
97
 Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 260 (D.D.C. 
2003). 
98
 Id. at 263–68.   
99
 Id. 
100 Id.  
101 Id. 
102 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (repealed 2008)). Id. 
at 271. 
103
 Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d. at 265.  
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Iran never paid.104 Over the course of the next decade, the 
plaintiffs tried unsuccessfully to attach and execute on Iranian assets 
across the country in order to satisfy the judgment.105 Given Iran’s 
minimal assets in the United States, the plaintiffs identified priceless 
Persian antiquities located in American Museums as the only 
meaningful source of recovery. The plaintiffs registered the judgment 
and initiated attachment proceedings in the First Circuit106 and the 
Northern District of Illinois.107 Though ultimately unsuccessful at 
executing their judgment on Iranian antiquities located at the Boston 
Museum of Fine Arts and Harvard University,108 the plaintiffs 
                                                 
104 Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 470 (7th Cir. 2016). 
105 See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. Civ. A. 01–1655, 2005 WL 
670770, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2005) vacated by, 563 F.Supp.2d 38 (D.D.C. 
2008) (granting and then vacating writs of execution against two domestic bank 
accounts used by Iranian consulates); Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 810 
F.Supp.2d 402 (D. Mass. 2011), aff'd, 709 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2013) (rejecting an effort 
to attach Iranian antiquities in the possession of various museums); Rubin v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 33 F.Supp.3d 1003 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (same); Rubin, 709 F.3d at 50, 
51; see also Rubin v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (N.D. Ill. 2004) 
(denying plaintiffs' attachment of museum's artifacts pursuant to TRIA); Bank of 
N.Y. v. Rubin, 05 Civ. 4926 (DLC), 2006 WL 633315 (S.D.N.Y March 16, 
2006) (denying plaintiffs' attachment of bank accounts); Rubin v. Islamic Rep. of 
Iran, No. Civ. A. 01-1655 (RMU), 2005 WL 670770 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 23, 
2005) (prohibiting plaintiffs from attaching bank accounts under TRIA); Rubin v. 
Islamic Rep. of Iran, 541 F.Supp.2d 416 (D. Mass. 2008) (denying plaintiffs' request 
to attach antiquities held by museums); Rubin v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 810 F.Supp.2d 
402 (D. Mass. 2011) (same); Alderman & Varner, at 3 (identifying plaintiffs' 
successful attachment of USD 390,000 Texas residence). See generally Alicia M. 
Hilton, Terror Victims at the Museums Gates: Testing the Commercial Activity 
Exception Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 53 VILL. L. REV. 479, 494–
95 (2008) (outlining Rubin plaintiffs' quest to attach property of Iran). Although 
plaintiffs successfully recovered upon an Iranian residence worth $390,000, this 
allowed the plaintiffs to recover only a small fraction of their judgment. Hegna v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 376 F.3d 485, 489 n. 14 (5th Cir. 2004).  
106 Rubin, 709 F.3d at 50. 
107 Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 408 F. Supp. 2d 549, 551 (N.D. Ill. 
2005). 
108 Rubin, 709 F.3d at 50. 
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continued their pursuit of the Persian antiquities in federal court in the 
Seventh Circuit. 
 
A.  District Court Opinion 
 
The plaintiffs named four collections of ancient Persian 
artifacts located in the territorial jurisdiction of the Northern District of 
Illinois to subject to attachment. The collections included the 
Persepolis Tablets, the Chogha Mish Collection, the Oriental Institute 
Collection—which were in the possession of the University of 
Chicago—and the Herzfeld Collection—which was split between the 
University of Chicago and the Chicago Field Museum of Natural 
History.109 If attached, the invaluable collections would be sold to the 
highest bidder at auction to pay the plaintiffs’ judgment award.110 
The District Court found that, “as a matter of law, no party 
other than Iran may assert Iran’s foreign sovereign immunity defenses 
under Sections 1609 and 1610 for the FSIA.”111 This ruling forced Iran 
to appear in litigation for the first time to try to protect the artifacts, 
which it later did.112 
For procedural reasons, Rubin already made its way to the 
Seventh Circuit once before.113 After the case was sent back down to 
the district court, Iran and the Museums moved for summary 
judgment.114 The district judge granted the motion, determining that 
the § 1610(a) exception to execution immunity was limited to 
commercial activity conducted by the foreign state itself, and not by a 
third party.115 Iran had not used the artifacts for commercial activity, 
                                                 
109 Rubin, 830 F.3d at 475–76.  
110 James Wawrzyniak, Rubin v. The Islamic Republic of Iran: A Struggle for 
Control of Persian Antiquities in America, YEARBOOK OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 
LAW 223, 227 (Sherry Hutt ed., 2008). 
111 Rubin, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 563. 
112 Id. 
113 See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2011).  
114 Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 33 F.Supp.3d 1017 (N.D. Ill. 2014). 
115 Id. 
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so the district judge held that § 1610(a) did not apply.116 The judge 
also held that execution under the TRIA was unavailable because the 
assets in question were not blocked by any current executive order.117 
The plaintiffs responded to the summary judgment motion by 
identifying a third possible path to reach the artifacts: § 1610(g). The 
plaintiffs argued that § 1610(g) is a free-standing exception to 
execution immunity available to victims of state-sponsored 
terrorism.118 The judge rejected this argument, however, holding that 
§ 1610(g) is not a freestanding terrorism exception to execution 
immunity. The district court found no statutory basis to execute on the 
artifacts and accordingly entered judgment for Iran and the 
Museums.119 The plaintiffs subsequently appealed this decision to the 
Seventh Circuit, reprising all three arguments.120  
 
B.  Appeal to the Seventh Circuit 
 
On appeal, the plaintiffs asserted the same arguments pursuant 
to § 1610(a), § 1610(g), and the TRIA. The Rubin majority opinion 
was written by Judge Bauer, Judge Sykes, and Chief Judge Reagan of 
the Southern District of Illinois. Judge Hamilton penned a short 
dissent.121 The court affirmed the District Court’s holding.  
 
1.  Collections Potentially Subject to Attachment 
 
As a threshold matter, the Seventh Circuit first identified which 
collections were potentially subject to attachment and execution by 
applying two basic criteria. First, the artifacts must be owned by Iran, 
and second, the artifacts must be within the territorial jurisdiction of 
                                                 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 1011. 
118 Id. at 1013. 
119 Id. at 1017.  
120 See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 470 (7th Cir. 2016). 
121 Id. 
21
Stephens: Storming the Persian Gates: The Seventh Circuit Denies Attachment
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017




the district court.122 The court found that there was no question that the 
Persepolis Tablets are owned by Iran and in the physical possession of 
the University, within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.123 The 
Persepolis Tablets, a collection consisting of roughly 30,000 dried clay 
tablets dating from 509 to 494 B.C., contain information about the 
Persian Empire.124 In 1931, the tablets were found underneath one of 
the fortification walls in Persepolis, modern day Iran. Although Iran 
owns the tablets, Iran permitted the University of Chicago’s Oriental 
Institute to conserve and research the tablets pursuant to a long-term 
loan.125  
However, the three other collections did not meet the criteria. 
The court held that the Herzfeld and the Oriental Institute Collections 
are not Iranian property, but are owned by their respective American 
institutions.126 Despite the plaintiff’s attempt to cast doubt on the 
legitimacy of the artifact’s removal from Iran,127 the museums 
maintained that they were bona fide purchasers or recipients of the 
collections, and Iran expressly disclaimed any legal interest in the two 
collections.128 The district court judge found no evidence that 
supported Iranian ownership of the artifacts, and plaintiffs did not 
meaningfully contest that point on appeal.129  
 Additionally, the Chogha Mish Collection was in the 
possession of the University when the district court entered judgment. 
However, upon request by the State Department, the University 
                                                 
122 Id. at 475. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a).  
123 Id. at 476. 
124 Hilton, supra note 105, at 486.  
125 Rubin, 830 F.3d at 476, 480.  
126 See id. at 476. 
127 The plaintiffs argued that Dr. Herzfeld is regarded by some in the academic 
community as a plunderer and that the artifacts in these collections are covered by 
Iran’s national heritage Protection Act of 1930, which gives the government of Iran 
an option to exercise control over certain antiquities unearthed in the country. Id. 
128 See id. 
129 See id. 
22
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 7
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol12/iss1/7




returned the Chogha Mish artifacts to Iran.130 Thus, at the time of the 
appeal, the collection was no longer within the territorial jurisdiction 
of the court. Accordingly, the court confined the merits of review to 
the Persepolis Tablets.131 
 On the merits of their appeal, the plaintiffs identified § 1610(a) 
and § 1610(g) of the FSIA, and § 201(a) of the TRIA as possible paths 
to execute their judgment on the Persepolis Tablets.  
 
2.  Execution Judgment Denied under Section 1610(a) 
  
The plaintiffs first pointed to § 1610(a)(7) as an avenue to 
execute their judgment on the Persepolis Tablets.132 The Seventh 
Circuit rejected this argument.133 The major issue that the court looked 
to under § 1610(a) was a question of statutory interpretation: where 
Congress did not identify who must “use” the property, does a third 
party’s use suffice?134 
Section 1610(a)(7) permits the holder of a judgment against a 
foreign state to execute on “property in the United States of a foreign 
state . . . used for a commercial activity in the United States” if the 
judgment relates to a claim for which the foreign state is not immune 
under § 1605A or § 1605(a)(7).135 The court found that the judgment 
did relate to a claim for which Iran was not immune under § 1605A, 
but took issue with the passive-voice phrasing of the above quote, 
which provided the basis of the key issue in this case: who must use 
the Iranian property for a commercial activity?136 
                                                 
130 See id. The University notified the Seventh Circuit that they return the 
artifacts unless the court ordered otherwise. The Seventh Circuit did not, and the 
University returned the artifacts to Iran’s National Museum in Tehran and filed 
notice with the court that Iran received and accepted them.  
131 See id.  
132 See id. at 478. 
133 See id. at 481. 
134 See id. at 479. 
135 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(7).  
136 Rubin, 830 F.3d at 479. 
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The plaintiffs argued that a third party’s commercial use of the 
property triggers § 1610(a) and that the University’s academic study of 
the Persepolis Tablets counts as a commercial use.137 Iran and the 
University countered that the foreign state itself must use the property 
for commercial activity and that academic study is not commercial 
use.138 The United States provided an amicus curiae brief supporting 
the latter argument.139 
 Following the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit’s holdings, the 
Seventh Circuit held that the exception is triggered only when the 
foreign state itself uses its property in the United States for 
commercial activity.140 The court reasoned that attributing the 
legislature’s use of a passive voice to reflect indifference to the actor 
would be inconsistent with the FSIA’s statutory declaration of purpose 
in § 1602, which explicitly invokes the international law 
understanding of foreign sovereign immunity that foreign sovereigns 
do not have immunity for “their commercial activities” or immunity 
from execution on “their commercial property.”141 The court deduced 
that § 1602’s declaration of purpose clarifies that a foreign state’s 
property is subject to execution under § 1610(a) only when the state 
itself uses the property for commercial activity.142  
 The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the declaration 
of purpose is irrelevant because resorting to legislative history is 
unnecessary when statutory language is unambiguous.143 The Seventh 
Circuit countered that § 1602 is legislation, not legislative history.144 
The court further asserted that the passive-voice phrasing of § 1610(a) 
                                                 
137 Id.  
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 See Aurelius Capital Partners v. Republic of Argentina, 584 F.3d 120, 131 
(2d Cir. 2009); Af-Cap. Inc. v. Chevron Overseas Ltd., 475 F.3d 1080, 109091 (9th 
Cir. 2007); Conn. Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo, 30 F.3d 240, 256 n.5 
(5th Cir. 2002). See also supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
141 Rubin, 830 F.3d at 479–80; 28 U.S.C. § 1602.  
142 See Rubin, 830 F.3d at 481. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a).  
143 Rubin, 830 F.3d at 479–80. 
144 Id. at 480. 
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creates uncertainty about whose commercial use of the property 
suffices to forfeit a foreign state’s execution immunity, so the words 
must be read “in their context and with a view to their place in the 
overall statutory scheme.”145 The court stated that although § 1610(a) 
does not unambiguously abrogate execution immunity when a third 
party uses a state’s property for commercial activity, the statutory 
declaration of purpose suggests that a narrower interpretation is 
correct, that a foreign state may lose its execution immunity only by 
its own commercial use of its property in the United States.146 
The plaintiffs further argued that the language in § 1605(a), 
that the commercial activity must be “carried on in the United States 
by the foreign state,” does not appear in § 1610(a).147 Thus, the 
commercial activity exception to execution immunity is broader than 
§ 1610(a), and applies to third parties.148 The court relied on the settled 
principle that exceptions to execution immunity are narrower than, and 
independent from, the exceptions to jurisdictional immunity.149 
Further, the court reasoned that seizing a foreign state’s property is a 
more serious affront to its sovereignty than taking jurisdiction in a 
lawsuit, and it carries far reaching implications for American property 
abroad. Thus, the court held that a third party’s commercial use of a 
foreign state’s property does not trigger the § 1610(a) exception to 
execution immunity, but § 1610(a) applies only when the foreign state 
itself has used its property for a commercial activity in the United 
States, and the actions of third parties are irrelevant.150 Because 
nothing in the record suggested that Iran itself used the Persepolis 
Tablets for a commercial activity in the United States, and the 
                                                 
145 Id. (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 529 U.S. 438, 450 
(2002)).  
146 Rubin, 830 F.3d at 480. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. See Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2256 
(2014); Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir. 2011); 
DeLetelier v. Rep. of Chile, 748 F.3d 790, 798–99 (2d Cir. 1984). 
150 Rubin, 830 F.3d at 481. 
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plaintiffs did not argue that they do, the court held that § 1610(a) did 
not apply.151  
 
3.  Section 1610(g) is Not a Freestanding Exception 
 
 Second, the plaintiffs pointed to § 1610(g) and made the argument 
that § 1610(g) makes all Iranian assets available for execution without 
needing to prove that the property has a nexus to commercial activity, 
as § 1610(a) requires.152 In other words, the plaintiffs argued that 
§ 1610(g) is a freestanding exception to execution immunity for 
terrorism-related judgments.153 The court rejected this argument.154  
 The text of § 1610(g) states that “the property of a foreign state 
against which a judgment is entered under section 1605A . . . is subject 
to attachment in aid of execution, and execution, upon that judgment 
as provided in this section . . . .”155 In its analysis, the court first 
identified the obvious textual parallels between § 1610(g) and the 
Bancec rule, concluding that § 1610(g) overrides the Bancec doctrine 
for terrorism-related judgments, as the defendants argued,156 and as the 
Seventh Circuit has previously held.157 The court next looked to the 
key question that was not decided in Gates — whether § 1610(g) 
establishes a freestanding terrorism exception to execution immunity. 
 The plaintiffs argued that the § 1610(g) language “as provided in 
this section”158 refers to only to the “non-substantive rules” set forth in 
§ 1610. However, the plaintiffs did not provide a basis to limit the 
phrase in this way, and they did not identify which non-substantive 
rules they thought Congress intended to include in § 1610(g).159 The 
                                                 
151 Id. 
152 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a), (g). 
153 Rubin, 830 F.3d at 481. 
154 Id. at 487. 
155 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1). 
156 The United States supported this interpretation in an amicus curiae brief. 
157 Rubin, 830 F.3d at 483. See also Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 755 F.3d 
568, 576 (7th Cir. 2014). 
158 Rubin, 830 F.3d at 482; 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1). 
159 Rubin, 830 F.3d at 484. 
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plaintiff’s argument relied on assumptions made about § 1610(g) in 
the Seventh Circuit Gates and Waytt decisions, and in the Ninth 
Circuit’s Bennett decision.160 
 The court declined to read the phrase in this way, arguing that it 
was odd to read “as provided in this section” as referring to only 
certain unidentified subsections.161 Instead, the court concluded that 
“section” means what it says: that § 1610(g) modifies all of § 1610, 
not just certain parts of it.162 The court further reasoned that treating 
§ 1610(g) as an independent basis for execution creates superfluities in 
other parts of the statute—if § 1610(g) were a freestanding exception 
to execution immunity, then the amendments enacted at the same time 
were completely unnecessary.163 Understanding § 1610(g) in this way, 
the court overruled Gates and Waytt in part, and declined to follow 
Bennett.164  
 The court reasoned that Gates assumed rather than decided the 
crucial question of whether § 1610(g) is itself a freestanding exception 
to execution immunity.165 The court in Gates simply described 
§ 1610(g) in a way that implied that it is an independent basis for 
attachment and execution for all terrorism-related judgments, without 
further inquiry.166 There is no mention in Gates of the limiting phrase 
in § 1610(g) “as provided in this section” nor any reference to 
statutory superfluities created by the broader interpretation advanced 
                                                 
160 Bennett v. Islamic Republic v. Iran, 799 F.3d 1281, 128687 (9th Cir. 
2015); Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 800 F.3d 333, 33334 (7th Cir. 2015); Gates, 
755 F.3d at 57475. 
161 Rubin, 830 F.3d at 484; 28 U.S.C. 1610(g)(1). 
162 Rubin, 830 F.3d at 484. 
163 Id. For instance, if § 1610(g) paves a dedicated lane for execution actions by 
victims of state-sponsored terrorism, then § 1610(a)(7), which relates specifically to 
judgments obtained under § 1605A, serve no purpose at all. Section 1610(a)(7) was 
enacted at the same time as § 1605A and added in the same 2008 legislation to make 
the commercial-activity exceptions applicable to judgments obtained under § 1605A.  
164 Id. at 487. See also Bennett, 799 F.3d 1281; Wyatt, 800 F.3d at 333; Gates, 
755 F.3d at 568.  
165 Gates, 755 F.3d at 576.  
166 Id. 
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by the Rubin plaintiffs in this case.167 The court conceded that there is 
no doubt that the opinion treats § 1610(g) as if it were an independent 
exception to execution immunity, albeit without actually deciding the 
questions.  
 Similarly, in Wyatt, the Seventh Circuit did not directly address 
the fundamental interpretative question about the scope of § 1610(g), 
leaving the underlying premise of Gates unexamined. The court relied 
on the holding of Gates that “[§] 1610(c) simply does not apply to the 
attachment of assets to execute judgments under § 1610(g) for state-
sponsored terrorism.’”168 Consequently, the Rubin court explicitly 
stated that “[t]o the extent that Gates and Wyatt can be read as holding 
that § 1610(g) is a freestanding exception to execution immunity for 
terrorism-related judgments, they are overruled.”169 
 The Rubin court then rejected the Ninth Circuit’s holding in 
Bennett, arguing that the Bennett majority explained away the “as 
provided in this section” language in § 1610(g) by interpreting it to 
apply only to § 1610(f).170 The court explained that this opinion 
“implausibly reads the word ‘section’ as ‘subsection,’ so the phrase ‘as 
provided in this section’ actually means ‘as provided in this subsection 
(f).’”171 The Rubin court explained that § 1610(f) never became 
operative,172 thus does not allow any form of execution, so if the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning is correct, § 1610(g) was effectively a nullity upon 
the passage.173 The court concluded that interpreting “as provided in 
this section” to refer only to § 1610(f), an inoperative part of the 
statute, makes no sense and cannot be the correct interpretation.174 If 
that were the case, then execution “as provided in this section” would 
                                                 
167
 See id.  
168 Wyatt, 800 F.3d at 343 (quoting id. at 575). 
169 Rubin, 830 F.3d at 487. 
170 Id. See also Bennett v. Islamic Republic v. Iran, 799 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir. 
2015). 
171 Rubin, 830 F.3d at 486. 
172 Id. at 486–87. 
173 Id. at 487. 
174 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1610(f), (g)(1). 
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mean no execution at all. Thus, the court declined to follow the Ninth 
Circuit’s interpretation of § 1610(g).   
 Based on this analysis, the court held that § 1610(g) is not itself 
an exception to execution immunity for terrorism-related judgments; 
rather, it abrogates the Bancec rule for terrorism-related judgments.175 
Accordingly, terrorism victims with unsatisfied § 1605A judgments 
against foreign states may execute on the foreign state’s property and 
the property of its agency or instrumentality—without regard to the 
Bancec presumption of separateness—but they must do so “as 
provided in this section.”176 That is, they must satisfy an exception to 
execution immunity found elsewhere in § 1610.177 Pertinent to the 
Rubin case, this required the plaintiffs to satisfy the commercial 
activity requirement laid out in § 1610(a).178  
 
4.  Dissent from the Denial of En Banc Review 
 
 In accordance with Circuit Rule 40(e), the Rubin opinion was 
circulated to all judges in active service.179 Circuit Rule 40(e) requires 
circulation within the court before publication to inquire whether a 
majority of active judges wish to rehear the case en banc.180 Chief 
Judge Wood and Circuit Judges Posner, Flaum, Easterbrook, and 
Rovner did not participate, so a majority did not vote to rehear the case 
en banc.181 Judge Hamilton filed a rare dissent from the denial of en 
banc review.182 
 In his dissent, Hamilton took issue with the fact that the panel had 
the power to partially overrule two recent Seventh Circuit decisions 
                                                 
175 Rubin, 830 F.3d at 487. 
176 Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g). 
177 Rubin, 830 F.3d at 487. 
178 Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a). See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g); supra note 150 and 
accompanying text.  
179 U.S. Ct. of App. Fed. Cir. Rule 40(e); Rubin, 830 F.3d at 487 n.6. 
180 Circuit Rule 40(e). 
181 Rubin, 830 F.3d at 487 n. 6. 
182 Id. 
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and create a circuit split without meaningful Rule 40(e) review.183 
Hamilton argued that either by itself would ordinarily trigger Rule 
40(e) review.184 In Rubin, the majority of active judges were 
disqualified, and thus did not have the opportunity to vote; it was 
functionally impossible to rehear the case en banc.185 Thus, Hamilton 
argued that one panel’s decision to overrule another’s decision should 
not be treated as settling the legal issue in the Seventh Circuit.186  
 Hamilton argued the practical consequences of ruling that 
§ 1610(g) does not offer a freestanding basis for executing judgments 
against state sponsors of terrorism independent of § 1610 (a) and 
(b).187 He also asserted that the Bennett and Rubin textual readings are 
both reasonable, and that the text is ambiguous.188 Thus, the courts 
must choose between two statutory readings: one that favors state 
sponsors of terrorism, or one that favors the victims of that 
terrorism.189 According to Hamilton, the court should favor a textual 
reading that favors the victims of terrorism.190 
 
5.  Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
 
 The plaintiffs’ third argument asserted that the Persepolis Tablets 
are subject to attachment and execution under § 201(a) of the TRIA.191 
Section 201(a) permits a person who holds a judgment against a state 
sponsor of terrorism to execute on the foreign state’s assets if the 
assets have been blocked by an executive order under certain 
international sanction provisions.192 Though President Carter blocked 
all Iranian assets in the United States, he subsequently unblocked all 
                                                 








191 Id. at 487. See TRIA § 201(a).   
192 TRIA § 201(a).   
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“uncontested property interest of the Iranian government.”193 The 
plaintiffs argued that the Persepolis Tablets were a contested property 
interest, and consequently, remained blocked by Executive Order 
12170.194 
 The court rejected this argument, citing the absence of evidence 
that the University contests Iran’s title to the Persepolis Tablets, and 
the University’s reaffirmation of the terms of the long-term academic 
loan, which unambiguously requires the University to return the 
artifacts to Iran upon completion of study.195 The court acknowledged 
the University’s possessory interest in the collection, but found it 
relevant only for the argument that Iran retains full ownership of the 
collection.196 
 The court also rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the Persepolis 
Tablets have been “reblocked” by President Obama’s Executive Order 
13599.197 The court reasoned that section 4(b) of Order 13599 
expressly exempts all “property and interests in property of the 
Government of Iran that were blocked pursuant to Executive Order 
12170 of November 14, 1979, and thereafter made subject to the 
transfer directives set forth in Executive order 12281 of January 19, 
1981.”198 
 The court dismissed the plaintiff’s interpretation of “transfer 
directives” to be a directive from Iran, reasoning that this misreads the 
2012 order, which refers to “transfer directives set forth in” Executive 
Order 12281 requiring all property meeting certain specified criteria 
be returned to Iran.199 That is, the directive is categorical rather than 
contingent on particularized demands by Iran. Accordingly, the court 
found that attachment and execution under § 201 was unavailable.200 
                                                 
193 Rubin, 830 F.3d at 488. 
194 Id. at 487. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.  
195 Id. at 488. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. See 77 Fed. Reg. 6659, 6660 (Feb. 8, 2012).  
198 Rubin, 830 F.3d at 488 (citing 77 Fed. Reg. 6659, 6660 (Feb. 8, 2012)).  
199
 Id. 
200 Id. at 489. 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
 
 From a statutory interpretation perspective, the Seventh Circuit 
reached the correct result in denying the plaintiffs execution on the 
Persepolis Tablets. Additionally, auctioning cultural property raises 
policy concerns that further buttress the Seventh Circuit’s outcome. 
However, the Rubin plaintiffs are deserving victims who have been 
denied execution of their judgment despite repeated attempts to do so. 
The Rubin victims are not alone; many other victims of state-
sponsored terrorism have been unsuccessful at receiving compensation 
for their grievous injuries. In lieu of a judicial remedy of the kind the 
plaintiffs sought, the executive branch should establish a 
comprehensive victim’s compensation fund, paid for by the United 
States government, to compensate the victims of state-sponsored 
terrorism.  
 
A.  The Court Correctly Interpreted § 1610(g) 
 
 The court’s interpretation that § 1610(g) is not a freestanding 
exception to execution immunity was correctly determined.201 Had the 
court found that § 1610(g) was a freestanding exception, it would 
permit plaintiffs to seize sovereign property without regard to its 
commercial status. The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity that 
was codified in the FSIA in 1976 was a codification of customary 
international law that permits adjudication of disputes arising from a 
foreign state’s commercial activities.202 The rules governing execution 
immunity are more restrictive than jurisdictional rules.203 There is no 
indication that customary international law has changed since 1976, 
nor that adjudication is permitted to extend beyond commercial 
activities. Sovereign immunity is a reciprocal arrangement; by 
ignoring the obligation to protect other states’ diplomatic property, the 
                                                 
201 Id. at 487. 
202 See supra Part II. 
203 Walters v. Indus. & Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 289 
(2nd Cir. 2011). 
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United States’ property abroad, valued anywhere from $12–$15 
billion, becomes increasingly vulnerable.204  
 Judge Hamilton’s contention that the language of § 1610(g) is 
ambiguous fails to understand the majority’s argument.205 Hamilton 
noted that the interpretation of § 1610(g) in both Bennett and in Rubin 
are reasonable.206 However, the Bennett majority purported to explain 
away the “as provided in this section” language in § 1610(g) by 
interpreting it to apply only to § 1610(f).207 This reading is not 
reasonable, as Judge Hamilton purported. As the Rubin majority 
explained, the Bennett court read the word “section” as “subsection” 
and interpreted “as provided in this section” to mean “as provided in 
subsection (f).”208 This is implausible and unreasonable, contrary to 
Hamilton’s suggestion.  
 Moreover, Hamilton conceded that “in interpreting an ambiguous 
statutory text, we can and should draw on statutory purpose and 
legislative history.”209 Hamilton concluded that the court must choose 
between one of the two statutory interpretations of the ambiguous text, 
one reading which favors state sponsors of terrorism, and the other 
which favors the victims of terrorism.210 Hamilton asserted that the 
court should interpret the statute in a light most favorable to the 
victims.211 While the plaintiffs are deserving victims who, arguably, 
most anyone would want to see compensated for their suffering, that 
alone is not sufficient for a judgment in their favor.  
 Hamilton posited that the court “should not attribute to Congress 
an intent to be so solicitous of state sponsors of terrorism, who are also 
                                                 
204 Kelly A. Atherton, Compensating Victims Under the "Terrorism-Exception" 
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A State-Sponsored Victim's Compensation 
Fund, 12 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DISP. RESOL. 158, 174 (2004). 
205 See Rubin, 830 F.3d at 489. 
206 Id. See Bennett v. Islamic Republic v. Iran, 799 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 2015). 
207 Bennett, 799 F.3d at 1287. 
208 Rubin, 830 F.3d at 486. 
209 Id. at 490. 
210 Id. at 489–90. 
211 Id. at 490. 
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undeserving beneficiaries . . . .”212 However, it is not clear that courts 
should ascribe such a congressional intent. The premise of the FSIA is 
to provide only narrow exceptions to sovereign immunity and, 
historically, Congress has been wary of providing plaintiffs with an 
avenue to sue a foreign state in the United States.213 There are other 
considerations to take account of, such as retaliatory suits against U.S. 
citizens abroad. This consideration may have more far reaching 
consequences than denying a terrorist victim the ability to sue a state 
sponsor of terrorism in the United States.  
 While § 1610(g) is intended to provide relief to terrorist victims, it 
should be viewed in light of the larger context of the FSIA. The 
dissent acknowledges that “[t]his Court has admonished that ‘no 
legislation pursues its purposes at all costs,’ and that it ‘frustrates 
rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that 
whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be the 
law.’”214 Section 1610(g) indeed provides relief to terrorist victims by 
abrogating the Bancec doctrine to make it easier for terrorist victims to 
pursue their claim against state-sponsors of terrorism. However, the 
court should not interpret this to mean that such plaintiffs are entitled 
to win at all cost.  
 Although the Rubin court’s statutory interpretation of § 1610(g) is 
a reasonable interpretation, it is troubling that courts continue to 
follow the Ninth Circuit’s view in Bennett. Around the time that the 
Rubin opinion was published, two other circuits issued an opinion on 
whether § 1610(g) is a freestanding exception to execution immunity. 
In Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran215 and Kirschenbaum v. 650 
Fifth Ave.,216 the D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit, respectively, 
                                                 
212 Id. 
213 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11.  
214 Rubin, 830 F.3d at 490. See Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–
26 (1987). 
215 F.3d, 2016 WL 4087940, at *8 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 2, 2016) (petition for 
rehearing pending) (characterizing §1610(g) as “stripping execution immunity from 
all property of a defendant sovereign” for terrorism judgments). 
216 F.3d 2016 WL 3916001 at *6 (2d Cir. July 20, 2016) (petition for rehearing 
pending) (same in dicta).  
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described § 1610(g) as freestanding. However, similar to the Ninth 
Circuit and the Seventh Circuit cases that Rubin overruled, these 
courts did not provide any analysis of the “as provided in this section” 
language.217  
 While it appears that all other circuits that have approached the 
issue have decided that § 1610(g) is freestanding, they have done so 
without adequate analysis. The Seventh Circuit is the only court that 
delves into the analysis of the grammatical structure of the language 
“as provided in this section.”218 The dissent claims that the language 
can be interpreted in two different ways. However, the Seventh 
Circuit’s arguments are incredibly persuasive, and the other courts did 
not provide arguments against this interpretation, as they have not 
delved into the analysis. For this reason, it appears that the language 
should be interpreted as the Rubin court has done.  
 In October 2016, the Rubin defendants submitted a petition for a 
writ of certiorari.219 In large part, the defendants identified the stark 
differences between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ contradictory   
holdings on § 1610(g).220 Perhaps the Supreme Court will settle this 
issue in the future. 
 
B.  Public Policy Supports the Court’s Interpretation 
 
Removed from the legal issues considered in Rubin, there 
exists an underlying policy concern that further buttresses the Seventh 
Circuit’s outcome: cultural property should not be used to satisfy a 
legal judgment. While this proposition rests on more ideological 
considerations rather than legal considerations, guiding principles in 
international and domestic conventions indicate that the Persepolis 
                                                 
217
 See Weinstein, F.3d, 2016 WL 4087940. See also Kirschenbaum, F.3d 2016 
WL 3916001. 
218 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1). 
219 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 
470 (7th Cir. 2016) (No. 16-543), 2016 WL 6124417. 
220 Id.  
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Tablets should be treated different from other property based on their 
status as cultural property. 221 
Cultural property is defined as “objects that are a product of a 
particular group or community and embody some expression of that 
group’s identity.”222 It is a “specific form of property that enhances 
identity, understanding, and appreciation for the culture that produced 
the particular property.”223 The preservation of cultural property 
requires measures against the destruction, mutilation, or division of 
sets and collections.224  
Article 1(2)(c) of the UNESCO Constitution, to which the 
United States is a party, identifies three obligations to cultural heritage 
that state parties must adhere to: (1) conservation and protection; (2) 
the recommendation of international conventions; and (3) the 
encouragement of international exchange.225 Scholars argue that, to 
uphold these principles, the United States must allow for “the question 
for knowledge, for valid information about the human past, for the 
historical, scientific, cultural and aesthetic truth that the object and its 
context can provide.”226 Further, the object must be “optimally 
accessible to scholars for study and to the public for education and 
enjoyment.”227 
The Persepolis Tablets hold great historical importance, as 
their text provides a unique cognizance of the Persian Empire. Prior to 
the tablet’s discovery, the Persian Empire was largely understood 
                                                 
221 Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of 
Cultural Property in the United States, 75 B.U.L. REV. 559, 601 (1995). 
222 Id. at 569. 
223 Id.  
224 Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. 
REV. 275, 298 (1982). 
225 Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization, preamble, Nov. 16, 1945, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=15244&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. 
226 John H. Merryman, Cultural Property Internationalism, 12 INT’L J. CULT. 
PROP. 11, 21 (2006).  
227 Id. 
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through the writing of contemporary foreigners.228 The tablets, written 
by the Persians themselves, provide a first-hand, impartial 
understanding of the everyday life and internal workings of the 
Empire.229 However, the analysis and publication of the tablets is still 
far from complete. Selling the collection would prevent scholars from 
completing the tablet’s study, and would prevent the public from 
accessing them for education; society at large would lose a wealth of 
knowledge.  
The preamble of the 1970 UNESCO Convention of the Means 
of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property, to which the United States is party, 
provides that “cultural property constitutes one of the basic elements 
of civilization and national culture,” and “that the interchange of 
cultural property among nations for scientific, cultural and educational 
purposes increases the knowledge of the civilization of Man, enriches 
the cultural life of all peoples and inspires mutual respect and 
appreciation among nations.”230 The 1970 Convention, however, acts 
as a set of guidelines, and is not self-executing. Thus, it does not exert 
legal authority over the United States.231   
In 1983, the United States passed the Convention on Cultural 
Property Implementation Act (CPIA) to implement the 1970 
Convention into law in the United States.232 The CPIA was 
implemented to “promot[e] U.S. leadership in achieving greater 
international cooperation towards preserving cultural treasures that not 
only are of importance to nations whence they originate, but also to a 
                                                 
228 Stein, supra note 2, at 3–4.  
229 Id.  
230 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting & Preventing the Illicit Import, 
Export, & Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Prop., Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 
231, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-
property/1970-convention/text-of-the-convention/ [hereinafter 1970 Convention]. 
231 The United States required Congress to enact legislation by which the 
convention would be implemented into domestic law to have domestic legal effect. 
PATTY GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE, AND THE LAW: CASES & 
MATERIALS 622–23 (3d ed. 2012). 
232 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–13. 
37
Stephens: Storming the Persian Gates: The Seventh Circuit Denies Attachment
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017




greater international understanding of our common heritage.”233 In 
addition, a comment by the U.S. Department of State regarding the 
U.S. Cultural Property Act contends that “[t]he legislation is important 
to our foreign relations, including our international cultural 
relations.”234  
While neither the 1970 Convention nor the CPIA provide 
controlling law over the Persepolis Tablets, the United States’ 
willingness to adhere to the principles set forth in the texts reinforces 
the idea that cultural property should not be used to satisfy a legal 
judgment. The Persepolis Tablets are “irreplaceable items of cultural 
heritage for the people of Iran.” 235 To demonstrate the modern 
significance of the tablets, Professor Gil Stein emphasizes that 
“Persepolis and the Persian Empire are the central symbols of Iranian 
cultural identity.”236 The tablets, as actual records of the Persian King 
Darius I, are incredibly important to the cultural heritage of the Iranian 
people.237 
In a petition to the court opposing seizure of the tablets, 
Attorney James S. Irani argued that the tablets belong not only to the 
Iranian government but “to the world as well.”238 As an irreplaceable 
piece of shared human history, the tablets themselves and the 
knowledge that they hold should be available to the world at large, not 
just to a single individual.  
In addition, permitting the attachment and execution of 
judgments on cultural property that is on loan from another country, 
and the subsequent sale of this cultural property, would have profound 
consequences. Countries would, understandably, be very wary of 
lending invaluable and irreplaceable artifacts to museums in the 
                                                 
233 S. REP. NO. 97-564, at 1 (1982). See also GERSTENBLITH, supra note 231, at 
557.  
234 GERSTENBLITH, supra note 231, at 558.  
235 Stein, supra note 2, at 3–4. 
236 Id.  
237 Id.  
238 James S. Irani, Petition to US Federal Court in Chicago Opposing Seizure 
of Ancient Persian Tablets, PAYVAND (Aug. 3, 2006), 
http://www.payvand.com/news/06/aug/1032.html.  
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United States. This would prevent the exchange and study of culture in 
the United States. At a time of rampant xenophobia in the United 
States, particularly towards Middle Easterners, cultural exchange and 
understanding are of the upmost importance. 
These policy concerns support the Seventh Circuit’s outcome 
in Rubin. Cultural artifacts should not be auctioned, even to award 
damages to the most deserving victims. Sympathetic, innocent 
plaintiffs such as those in Rubin make a strong case that their rights to 
recovery should prevail over more dubious sociological ownership 
claims. However, it would be tragic for society-at-large to remedy the 
plaintiff’s grievances by sending cultural property to the auction block.  
 
C.  Congress Should Implement a Comprehensive Victims 
Compensation Fund  
 
While the Rubin decision properly shielded the Persepolis 
Tablets from execution, the Rubin plaintiffs are deserving victims 
whose grievances should be remedied. For the past thirteen years, the 
Rubin victims have tirelessly pursued execution of their judgment. 
Despite the time and money that they have devoted to endless court 
battles, their judgment remains unsatisfied. The United States 
government and federal courts have been unable to compel state-
sponsors of terrorism to pay the judgments awarded against them. In 
large part, this is due to the inadequate funds available from foreign 
states’ assets in the United States to pay successful litigants. Congress 
should provide an alternative to these lawsuits through a 
comprehensive victim compensation fund. Such a fund would 
guarantee that victims are compensated, regardless of a terrorist state’s 
available property in the United States, and would satisfy several U.S. 
policy concerns. 
Congress has already created limited a victim compensation 
fund to provide compensation to victims of state-sponsored terrorism. 
In December 2015, President Obama signed the Justice for United 
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States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act (“VSST”).239 The 
VSST, part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, is an 
omnibus spending bill passed by Congress to set aside funds to 
compensate victims of state sponsored terrorism with unsatisfied final 
court judgments.240 This fund, overseen by a Special Master, will 
receive over $1 billion in appropriations from the Treasury 
Department in 2017.241 The VSST will compensate eligible victims 
for:  
 
compensatory damages awarded to a United States 
person in a final judgment issued by a United States 
district court . . . against a state sponsor of 
terrorism; and arising from acts of international 
terrorism, for which the foreign state was 
determined not to be immune from jurisdiction . . . 
under section 1605A.242  
 
Claimants with final judgments dated before July 14, 2016 must have 
filed their application for compensation by October 12, 2016.243 
Filings are confidential, and it is therefore unclear whether the Rubin 
plaintiffs filed for compensation. 
While the VSST is a terrific start to compensating terrorism 
victims, it does not provide a true alternative to lawsuits, as the fund 
will not satisfy the entirety of the Rubin plaintiffs’ judgment award. 
The fund will pay no more than $20 million to individual claimants, 
regardless of whether their claim exceeds that amount.244 While a one 
billion dollar fund appears significant, a 2008 report by the 
                                                 
239 42 U.S.C. § 10609. 
240 Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. VICTIMS OF STATE SPONSORED 
TERRORISM FUND, http://www.usvsst.com/faq.php (last visited Nov. 20, 2016). 
241 United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund, LEGAL FUNDING, 
http://www.legalfunding.com/eligible-cases/Victims-Of-State-Sponsored-Terrorism-
Fund-/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2016). 
242 42 U.S.C. § 10609(c)(2)(A)(i)–(ii). 
243 U.S. Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund, supra note 240.  
244 Id.  
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Congressional Research Service indicated that there are nineteen 
billion dollars in outstanding judgments against state-sponsors of 
terrorism.245 Further, given the number of claims that have already 
been submitted to the VSST, it is anticipated that initial payments will 
be less than the total eligible claim amount.246  
Furthermore, the VSST only provides compensation for 
compensatory damage awards.247 The VSST defines compensatory 
damages as “excluding pre-judgment and post-judgment interest or 
punitive damages.”248 Therefore, while the fund may satisfy the Rubin 
plaintiff’s $71.5 million compensatory damages award, their $300 
million award for punitive damages, the bulk of their award, will 
remain unsatisfied. To fully compensate the Rubin victims and other 
similarly situated victims of state-sponsored terrorism, Congress must 
designate further appropriations to the VSST and must expand claims 
to include punitive damages.  
Taxpayers will likely oppose a compensation fund that is 
funded by taxpayer dollars, as opposed to requiring Iran to pay 
damages. Nevertheless, it is in the Untied State’s best interest to fully 
compensate victims of state-sponsored terrorism to prevent U.S. based 
lawsuits against Iran.  
Allowing American citizens to sue Iran neither protects 
Americans from terrorist attacks, nor improves the effectiveness of the 
United States’ response to the attacks. States will continue to support 
terrorist attacks on foreign soil, regardless of whether the state is 
subject to litigation on American soil. However, allowing suit against 
foreign nations in the United States weakens the U.S.’s approach to 
dealing with state sponsors of terrorism, and potentially opens up 
American service members, diplomats, and private entities to spurious 
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of Terrorism, LAWFARE (Dec. 28, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/omnibus-
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lawsuits in courts around the world. For instance, Iran and Cuba have 
each passed legislation encouraging retaliatory suits in their courts.249  
A compensation fund for these victims reflects both foreign 
policy considerations as well as domestic goals of compensation and 
deterrence. Implementing a victim’s compensation fund that pays the 
full amount of the victim’s damages will prevent U.S. courts from 
having to freeze foreign states' assets or attach property to enforce 




 Alexander the Great sacked Persepolis in retaliation for 
Persia’s burning of the Athenian Acropolis. Should the United States 
accord compensation to the victims of Iranian-sponsored terrorist acts 
by once again permitting the plunder of Persian cultural property? 
While this time it is deserving terrorism victims that have stormed the 
Persian Gates, the Seventh Circuit denied them entry. From a statutory 
interpretation perspective, the Seventh Circuit reached the correct 
result in denying the plaintiffs execution on the Persepolis Tablets. 
Auctioning cultural property also raises policy concerns that further 
buttress the Seventh Circuit’s outcome. However, the Rubin plaintiffs 
are deserving victims who have been denied execution of their 
judgment despite repeated attempts to do so. The Rubin victims are not 
alone; many other victims of state-sponsored terrorism have been 
unsuccessful at receiving compensation for their grievous injuries. In 
lieu of a judicial remedy of the kind the plaintiffs sought, the executive 
branch should establish a comprehensive victim’s compensation fund, 
paid for by the United States government, to compensate the victims 
of state-sponsored terrorism.  
                                                 
249 Atherton, supra note 204, at 173–74. After United States courts decided 
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Iranian “victims of United States interference” to sue the United States for damages. 
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